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SUMMARY 
The logical links between the Judaeo-Christian doctrine of creation and 
the practice of natural philosophy on the one hand and the rejection of 
belief in demonic agency on the other were made explicit in the 
seventeenth century by, among others, Balthasar Bekker (1634-1699), 
whose ideas I argue to have been not without influence. In Section 1 I 
present the accounts of three historians of the opposition to belief in 
witchcraft and of the decline of the witch-persecution, Hugh Trevor-
Roper, Keith Thomas and Brian Easlea. In Section 2 I maintain that 
Bekker has been under-estimated both by Trevor-Roper and by Easlea. In 
Section 3 I investigate more generally some of the connections between 
the new natural philosophy and belief in supernatural interventions, 
cast doubt on the view that rejection of belief in witchcraft and the 
devil requires rejection of belief in creation, and thus supplement or 
qualify the accounts of Trevor-Roper, Thomas and Easlea of why belief in 
witchcraft faded away. 
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BALTHASAR BEKKER AND THE DECLINE OF THE WITCH-CRAZE: THE OLD 
DEMONOLOGY AND THE NEW PHILOSOPHY 
Was the Judaeo-Christian belief in creation able to serve as a 
consistent defence of early modern science? And how adequate was the 
theistic cosmology of the Cartesians and of the Baconians of the 
Royal Society at contesting belief in supernatural interventions in 
nature by witches, demons or the devil? Ideas certainly have but a 
limited power to uphold or to subvert beliefs and practices until the 
social conditions are propitious, and are otherwise often powerless. 
But when social conditions are right, as plausibly they were in 
several Western European societies in the second half of the 
seventeenth century for the curtailment of the persecution of 
witches, revolutions of thought and belief can prove crucial. It is 
therefore worth investigating which ideas helped to curtail what Hugh 
Trevor-Roper has called "the European witch-craze",
1 
and whether the 
theistic opponents of witch-beliefs and proponents of the new natural 
philosophy had a consistent and coherent case to present, as opposed 
to an ineffectual one or a case suitable only to give short-term 
support to the interests of the ruling classes, but otherwise lacking 
in merit. I shall claim that their case was consistent and coherent, 
and that its significance should not be underestimated. 
In Section 1 I shall present the accounts of three historians of 
the opposition to belief in witchcraft and of the decline of the 
witch-persecution, Trevor-Roper, Keith Thomas
2
 and Brian Easlea
3
. 
In Section 2 I shall maintain that at least one of the opponents 
of witch-beliefs, the Calvinist and Cartesian Balthasar Bekker, has 
been under-estimated both by Trevor-Roper and by Easlea. In Section 
3 I shall investigate more generally some of the connections 
between the new natural philosophy and belief in supernatural 
interventions within nature, cast doubt on the view that rejection 
of belief in witchcraft and the devil requires rejection of belief 
in God and creation, and apply these various conclusions so as to 
supplement or qualify the accounts of Trevor-Roper, Thomas and 
Easlea of why witch-hunts lapsed and belief in witchcraft faded 
away. 
 
 
1 
Hugh Trevor-Roper, after remarking the collapse of the European 
witch-craze in the late seventeenth century, claims that its demise 
cannot be set down to the arguments of its critics, as the critics 
had no new arguments to put forward at this stage, and as the 
opposition case had remained unmodified ever since Johann Weyer's De 
Praestigiis Daemonum of 1563.
4
 Moreover intellectual objections to 
peripheral elements in the cosmology of the day, such as belief in 
witchcraft, remained incapable of effecting change until the system 
as a whole was attacked at its centre; and even then the social 
conditions which nourished the witch-craze needed to change before 
new systems of belief could have a social impact (160f., 168-80, 
190-92). Social factors such as religious conflict had continually 
fanned the flames of the witch-persecution since the intellectual 
framework of witch-beliefs was laid down in Malleus Maleficarum of 
1486, and the intellectual case against the persecution of witches 
was powerless against it (130-61). 
Thus the philosophical opposition of Neoplatonists, and of sceptics 
such as Montaigne, was unavailing against a socially entrenched 
orthodoxy and its theological champions (130-34); and writers such as 
the Platonist Weyer, "the boldest of them all" (159), and the 
Englishman Reginald Scot, contended not that witches did not exist or 
that compacts with Satan were impossible, but merely that judges failed 
to identify them correctly (146-49). But their advocacy of caution led 
only to accusations of softness on witches and of responsibility for 
spread of the witchcraft menace (148f., 159). 
Likewise Balthasar Bekker, who attempted to challenge the whole idea 
of Satan's kingdom, effectively had no arguments to add to those of 
Weyer, Scot and Spee, and his influence has been much exaggerated (173-
75); indeed there was nothing original either about the arguments of 
Thomasius of Halle in the early eighteenth century, despite the fact 
that they were effective (175f.). The change came about because of a 
change of social and intellectual climate; and the intellectual climate 
changed through attacks on the entire cosmology which supported witch-
beliefs on the parts of people such as Bacon, Grotius, Selden and 
Descartes, despite their reticence, which amounted almost to silence, on 
the subject of witchcraft in particular (180-83, 192). The final 
intellectual victory thus belonged to Descartes, to the English deists 
and the German Pietists, and thus to the spiritual parents of the 
eighteenth-century Enlightenment (183). 
Keith Thomas' account of the decline of witch-beliefs
5
 concerns 
England rather than Europe, and deals with the special background of 
the impact of the Protestant Reformation there (469-501), popular 
clamour against witches which long outlasted the repeal in 1736 of 
the Witchcraft Act (582-83), and, on Thomas' account, a tendency for 
accusations to arise as a result of the curses of old women 
with genuine grievances such as a refusal of charity (502-
69) Thomas is critical of Trevor-Roper's ascription of 
witch-persecution to the clash of different religious 
groups, at any rate where England is concerned (499), or of 
any ascription of it to the religious zeal of government or 
ecclesiastics there (501). Rather it was the educated classes 
in Britain who eventually put an end to prosecutions, first by 
effectively refusing to administer the witchcraft laws, and 
later by repealing them. 
Thomas traces the decrease in convictions for 
witchcraft to an increasing awareness of the difficulty of 
establishing the case for the prosecution, particularly in 
the absence of the kind of torture routinely employed in 
such cases on the continent (570-76), and also to 
experiences of influential people of unjust accusations 
(576-77). And he explains the silent decay of witch-
beliefs (570) by two new, self-confident, seventeenth-
century attitudes, the assumption of a regular and orderly 
universe, unlikely to be upset by supernatural interventions 
(577-78), and the "conviction that it would one day be 
possible to uncover the natural causes of those events which 
still remained mysterious" (578). The assumption of 
regularity was associated with the new mechanical philosophy 
and the related theology of an orderly providence; the 
conviction that causes as yet unknown would later be found 
was reinforced by scientific progress, and by psychological 
explanations of witches' delusions. Meanwhile the popular 
feeling against witches may have diminished with the 
abatement of the tensions over the relief of poverty, once a 
more regular system of provision for the poor was in force 
(581-8). 
Before the achievements of the Royal Society came to 
prominence the assumption of a regular natural order was 
fostered by the Neoplatonic conception of universal occult 
influences (sympathies, antipathies, etc.), which made resort 
to supernatural or demonic explanations unnecessary; in 
particular the scepticism of Scot about witchcraft was 
facilitated by his Neoplatonism. Scot's Discoverie of 
Witchcraft(1584) was widely influential in England among the 
magistracy and the clergy; and was much more radical than 
Trevor-Roper allows (573). Scot's admission that witches exist 
conveyed only that there were some maleficent self-styled 
witches who resorted to poison, and some impostors profiting 
from gullibility; but none had supernatural power, and indeed a 
compact with the devil was impossible. Scot was not merely 
disputing the adequacy of current identifications of witches, 
though it was over the logical difficulty of proving 
accusations that his main influence in England took effect 
(572-73). 
Brian Easlea, an historian whose feminist commitments are 
allied to scholarship and insight into early modern science 
and early modern witch-hunts, accepts (with Trevor-Roper) that 
the arguments of Weyer and Scot largely fell on deaf ears 
(18f., 42). But, unlike Trevor-Roper, he holds something which 
Thomas also implies, namely that Scot was considerably more 
radical than the reluctant Neoplatonist Weyer (18, 24, 96), 
and in more than one way. Where Weyer accepted the 
possibility of Satanic compacts, Scot rejected it; and 
where Weyer sought to excuse witches because of 
their stupidity as uneducated old women, Scot 
foregoes prejudice against females, the elderly or the 
humble, rejects demonic magic altogether, and pleads for 
forgiveness (except in cases of poisoning) where (as seldom) 
there was genuine evidence of actual maleficence (19-24). 
Easlea finds further cause for feminist praise in the sceptical 
case presented by Montaigne, with his rejection of conventional 
stereotypes both of witches and of women. More to the point, 
Easlea concludes that Thomas fails to do justice to Scot, and even 
to Weyer, when he claims that the mechanical philosophy of the 
Royal Society proved a more rational intellectual scaffolding for 
the belief that every event has a natural cause that the 
"credulous" beliefs of the Neoplatonists; indeed Easlea ably 
demonstrates that the mechanical philosophy was also beset 
by fundamental problems (40-42, 142-95), and was not 
altogether deserving of the laurels awarded by Thomas.
In a later chapter
6
 Easlea holds that the triumph of the 
mechanical philosophy over Neoplatonist natural magic was at least 
as much due to its upholding the religious and social establishment 
as to its suitability for justifying "the appropriation of nature" 
as to its intellectual merits. At the same time belief in Satanic 
magic and the powers of witches became dispensable and faded from 
sight (197-98), even though no rejection of these beliefs was 
required by Cartesianism (200f.). Indeed Easlea finds the case of 
Joseph Glanvill, that rejection of these beliefs implies the 
rejection of belief in God, more cogent than Thomas Sprat's 
confidence that the theistic and socially conformist experimental 
philosophy of the Royal Society was sufficient to undermine belief 
in supernatural interventions in nature (201-15). He also remarks 
that Henry More and, to some degree, Robert Boyle, supported 
Glanvill's witch-beliefs, and that therefore membership of the 
Royal Society was no guarantee of disbelief in witchcraft (206-
07). 
  Easlea does not dispute that the mechanical philosophy may have 
accounted for the decline of witch-beliefs (5, 198); but, granted the 
evidence that some of the adherents of the new natural philosophy 
actually strengthened witch-beliefs, he finds an inconsistency in 
Sprat's claim that the new philosophy both convinces people of religious 
truths and overcomes belief in spirits and demons (212), and he is 
unimpressed by the confidence of the new philosophers at the 
restoration of the human dominion over nature, whether Fontenelle 
(217f.), Newton (220) or Bekker (218f.). Consistency would have required 
a rejection of belief in God and in creation at the same time as the 
rejection of supernatural interventions in nature; but no such rejection 
was possible while religion was needed by so many vested interests and 
while it remained in general a prop of the established order of male 
ruling élites (220-222). Gerrard Winstanley was more consistent in 
rejecting simultaneously Satan, the God of traditional theism and 
private property too (222-231). 
It is not yet time to assess the accounts outlined in this Section; 
but it is appropriate to grant to Easlea a point also made by Thomas, 
namely that Reginald Scot was able to reject belief in the devil's power 
before the scientific revolution had effectively come about, and that the 
decrease in witch-persecution in England through most of the seventeenth 
century was partly due to his influence. Thus Neoplatonism was capable of 
supplying a philosophical basis from which witch-beliefs could 
effectively be opposed.
7
 This can be granted without allowing that it was 
as effective an antidote to witch-beliefs, or as rational a system, as 
the mechanical philosophy was to become. 
2 
 
Thomas produces strong evidence for the conclusion that Scot was 
more original and more radical than Trevor-Roper presents him, a 
conclusion which Easlea's evidence confirms.
8 
It has also been granted 
to Easlea that Scot exercised a considerable influence in England, 
though it could hardly be said that his Neoplatonism supplied a strong 
enough platform for the overthrow of European witch-beliefs in general. 
The possibility now emerges that Trevor-Roper also underestimates the 
influence and importance of another critic of the witch-craze who was 
explicitly indebted to Scot, and in some matters went no further than 
Scot
9
, Balthasar Bekker (1634-98), and that Bekker's Calvinism and 
Cartesianism justified his confidence that nature is regular and that 
witchcraft is impossible better than Easlea allows. For if Bekker was no 
more radical than the underestimated Scot, he would himself have been more 
radical than Trevor-Roper suggests. In fact, however, I shall be claiming 
that he was much more radical, influential and significant than this; and, 
as Trevor-Roper may seem to have established that Bekker's influence was a 
mere flash in the pan, I consider the question of his influence first, 
and then turn to his arguments.
It is not disputed that within two months of the publication in 1690 
of Bekker's de Betoverde Weereld (‘The Enchanted World’) four thousand 
copies of the first two volumes were sold in the United Provinces (i.e. 
The Netherlands), and also that translations soon appeared in French, 
Italian and German.
10 
There seems also, in fact, on the say-so of one of 
Bekker's numerous detractors, to have been a translation at this stage 
into Spanish.
11 
It is further agreed that a host of pamphlets was 
produced in reply.
12 
Jacob Brunnemann was indeed mistaken to claim that 
Bekker was responsible for the cessation of witch-burnings in England, 
where witches had never been burned, and in Holland, where burnings had 
ceased longsince;
13 
but this was the time at which the hanging of witches 
ceased in England - the last execution was in 1685
14 
- and his work could 
have contributed to the climate of belief and of practice. There was, in 
any case, a massive controversy in Holland, as attested by the 131 
contemporary Dutch works concerning Bekker listed in van der Linde's 
bibliography,
15 
which resulted in Bekker's losing his job as a minister 
of the Calvinist church,
16
 despite some earlier triumphs over opponents 
within it. 
Trevor-Roper claims, however, that Bekker's foreign reputation may have 
been a myth. Thus the controversy was, he says, conducted almost entirely 
in Dutch: only one item in van der Linde's bibliography is in French, and 
the remaining two are in Latin. But this nineteenth century bibliography 
clearly failed to be comprehensive. Thus a monograph published in far-away 
Konigsberg and also at Leipzig in 1721 by G.H. Beckher
17 
lists refutations 
of Bekker from all over Germany by writers at Wittenberg, Dresden, Hamburg, 
Danzig and Jena, and by several others of untraceable provenance. It 
mentions controversy at Halle, and support for Bekker from, among others, 
Winckler of Hamburg, Osiander of Tübingen and Stoschius of Brandenburg; 
and the author subsequently pleads that, despite the mass of argument and 
counter-argument which he has cited, he has been forced to omit a great many 
contributions to the great debate. As witches were still being burned in 
German-speaking areas, it is of great importance that Bekker's ideas helped to 
make it possible there to doubt the demonology which upheld the 
practice. So concerned were Bekker's opponents that he might win the 
day that in 1721 they even translated the English refutation of John 
Beaumont into German.
18
 
This evidence also serves to confute Trevor-Roper 's claim that the 
controversy was soon over, despite Benjamin Binet's remarks of 1696 that 
Bekker's disciples were falling away, disappointed by his later volumes, 
and that there was little to add to the many refutations then current.
19 
Indeed in 1699 Binet felt it worth publishing anonymously in Amsterdam a 
further edition of his refutation of 1696.
20
 Nor did the defects of the 
German translation, remarked by Eberhard Hauber,
21 
prevent enough of 
Bekker's ideas being conveyed for the widespread German controversy attes-
ted above to take place; their transmission may have been helped by the 
corrected second edition.
22
 
It was, however, the French translation
23 
which conveyed Bekker's thought 
to Europe at large, and Bekker had the good sense to supervise its 
production. The first English rendering, The World Bewitched (1695), was 
based on the French text
24
: it contained Volume I and a synopsis of the 
other three volumes only, but this was enough to transmit the kernel of 
Bekker's thought. There followed a further English translation, this time 
of an abridgement made by Bekker himself, which appeared two years after 
his death, in 1700
25 
- further evidence of a continuing interest; and soon 
Bekker's ideas were to be incorporated into John Toland's Adeisidaemon 
of 1709, which took on in its turn the role of butt for traditionalists. 
As to the position in Holland itself, Bekker's critic Kettner declared 
that Bekker had caused more trouble in two months than all the priests could 
put a stop to in twenty years.
26 
What then of Trevor-Roper's view that Bekker's 
work enjoyed a succès de scandale only (174)? He mentions that Beaumont sent 
to Holland for literature on Bekker just prior to his publication of 1705, and 
could only secure one small French volume (that of Binet, in fact). But this 
seems to show rather that Beaumont was poorly served and too easily satisfied; 
for by this stage many of the Dutch works listed by van der Linde had been 
published. Trevor-Roper also cites the remarks of a French officer who 
visited Holland in 1673 as evidence of how little Bekker had to do with 
the destruction of witch-beliefs among the Dutch laity; most Dutchmen, 
the foreign observer claimed, regarded Hell as a "phantom" and Paradise 
as "an agreeable chimera" invented by the clergy to encourage virtue 
(175).
27 
Yet some of the Dutch laity must have had a hand in 
depriving Bekker of his job; and, though scepticism about Hell 
had long been current in some quarters in England,
28
 it is unlikely 
that it was universal in Holland by 1673, or that the contacts formed 
on a single military visit could supply strong enough evidence to 
support the Frenchman's claim. The scale of the controversy within 
Holland makes it likelier that Bekker touched a sensitive nerve and 
that his stance was initially an unpopular one; it may have been more 
than a straw in the wind that he was compared by Kettner with that 
other impostor, Benedictus Spinoza. 
There followed the controversy about Bekker in Germany, where at 
Halle effective propaganda against belief in witchcraft was produced 
by P.J. Spener, Christian Thomasius and their associates.
29 
Thomasius 
certainly distanced himself from Bekker, but only to avoid 
accusations of extremism.
30 
The social and intellectual climate was now 
receptive to the arguments against witch-beliefs, and Bekker's 
arguments were available among them, and were often borrowed by 
Thomasius
31
 
I am not claiming that Bekker turned the tide against witch-
beliefs single-handed, or that his contribution to the sceptical case 
was vastly greater than those of e.g. Scot or Thomasius. Due 
allowance must in any case be made for social factors and trends 
which lay beyond the immediate influence of ideas. But, this said, it 
can reasonably be maintained that Bekker's influence both abroad and, 
probably, in Holland was much greater than Trevor-Roper represents 
it, and great enough to cast fresh doubt on witch-beliefs in those 
large areas of Europe where doubt was already possible, both in 
places where prosecutions were already declining (as in France and 
England) and where they were still widespread (as in Germany). 
But what, precisely, was Bekker's position? Earlier writers had 
argued that the evidence supposed to identify witches was inadequate, 
and Bekker's arguments in this regard were explicitly derived from 
Scot.
32
 He also agreed with Scot about the impossibility of witchcraft, 
and was thus significantly more radical than Weyer; but his grounds 
were different from Weyer's or Scot's. 
Bekker's original contribution lay in his application of Cartesian 
reason and of Cartesian premises to theology and demonology. Personal 
experience had taught him to mistrust opinion and conventional sentiments, 
and to rely on reason and Scripture alone;
33 
and as it was to Scripture 
that the defenders of witch-beliefs appealed, a reasoned interpretation of 
the Bible was essential for the sceptical case. Bekker did not regard 
reason as the measure of Scripture, but he did hold that the study of 
Scripture presupposes reason, which is indispensable if Scripture is to be 
understood even in its own area of competence, that of salvation. 
Scripture is not, however, a textbook of natural philosophy, which is 
solely the department of reason. Besides, Scripture must not be approached 
in a biased way, and it is reason which is required if prejudice is to be 
avoided.
34
 "If we consider the Scriptures with a perfectly open and 
unbiased mind, we shall certainly not attribute to the Devil those powers 
and activities which preconceived ideas led the commentators and 
translators to ascribe to him.
"35 
Accordingly it is hardly appropriate to 
regard Bekker as a Biblical fundamentalist,
36
 unless this just means 
someone willing to regard the Bible as an authority; and without such a 
willingness no headway was likely to be made by the sceptical case about 
witch-beliefs in the seventeenth or, come to that, the early eighteenth 
century. 
Besides shaping his approach to Scripture, Bekker's Cartesianism proved 
capable of direct application to demonology. Thus it taught him that the 
devil is a spirit and that no spirit, not even the devil, can act on body 
without a body as its instrument; accordingly physical changes ascribed to 
the devil must be performed with matter and motion, in which case 
ordinary explanations apply to them, or else they are impossible.
37 
Further 
"There is no argument so absurd as that of attributing an unusual effect to an 
occult or unknown cause, but above all to these sorts of (spiritual) 
intellects, as people want to do, in order to draw as a consequence that they 
have the power and the capacity to do such things. Why not rather investigate 
deeply into knowledge of Nature, in order to be able to unite things corporeal 
into things corporeal?"
38
 Hence, unless there is reason to believe that the 
devil has a body, his alleged temptings, compacts and possessions are 
impossible; and the alleged facts which demonic agency is invoked to explain 
are either natural and subject to universal explanations, or else contrary 
to nature and thus no facts at all. 
Moreover reason allows us to go back to the original Greek of the 
gospels, and 
conclude that the tempter of Christ was either a wicked man or a 
vision;
39 
it shows that witchcraft phenomena are exceptionlessly 
subject to doubt and the possibility of deception;
40 
that belief in 
a devil with any independence of his own amounts not to monotheism 
but to "Ditheism";
41 
and that belief in demons and the devil is a 
relic of paganism.
42
 Indeed Scripture and reason together show that 
the devil is bound in Hell, and thus cannot operate on Earth, and 
is thus not to be feared, and that "the Empire of the Devil is a 
Chimaera".
43
  
 
Accordingly Bekker's case should not be dismissed as "purely 
theological”.44 His positive interpretations of particular texts 
could, of course, be disputed, but his Cartesian premises, if accepted, 
set a firm limit to possible interpretations. Any claims about the 
world which exceeded these limits were impossible; and, as long as the 
Bible was treated as authoritative, interpretations had to be possibly 
true to be acceptable. Thus in effect Bekker's case was a direct 
application to current demonology of Cartesianism. Further, in pointing 
to the heretical Manichaean tendencies of current demonology he added 
to that case a substantial and weighty argument. For, quite apart from 
the points arising from Bekker's Cartesian metaphysics and methodology, 
if the devil is wholly an instrument of God, then he has no empire, and 
if he is held to have any power of his own, then belief in one God has 
been abandoned in favour of an heretical belief in two. If we consider 
also Bekker's interpretations of the Bible, his historical critique and 
the arguments borrowed from Scot about the identification of witchcraft 
and the psychology of witches, we find a formidable system. Moreover it 
was a system which Bekker was willing to test against experience: he 
gave the devil ample opportunities to prove his power in the 
traditional domain of chaos, the sea, but Bekker's ship remained 
unscathed. Hence the taunt of Bekker's crusading preface: "If he (the 
devil) be a God, let him defend his Cause; let him assault, whilst I am 
pulling down his altars... In the name of the Lord of Hosts I meet that 
Goliah: lets see who will lend him a helping hand!"
45
 These are not 
only words of self-identification with Gideon and David, but also of 
confidence in human autonomy and in a natural order established by a 
single providence. 
 
APPENDIX 
The witch-beliefs of cultures different from our own are often held to 
embody a rationality of their own which is unamenable to external criticism; 
and certainly in parts of the Continent in the Early Modern period once a 
woman had been accused of dealings with the devil nothing could happen which 
could constitute evidence of innocence, whatever anyone said. But as we have 
seen there were at all stages critics of witch-beliefs; and even those less 
radical than Bekker often remarked the inconsistency of trials which 
established guilt where nothing would count as evidence to the contrary. These 
were external criticisms, insofar as the critics wholly or partially rejected 
current demonology as a system of belief, though they were also made by 
members of the witch-hunting society, who were often made to suffer for their 
criticism or accused of witchcraft themselves. Witch-beliefs thus formed, at 
times, a watertight system, nothing counting as counter-evidence; but the 
remarks of the critics were not regarded as unintelligible, but as requiring 
rebuttal such as that meted out by Jean Bodin to Weyer or by Binet, Kettner 
and others to Bekker. It should further be noted that witch-beliefs did, in 
the end, succumb to factors including the rational criticisms of people such 
as Scot and Bekker. Early Modern witch-beliefs, then, were not unamenable to 
external criticism; whether or not the same applies to the witch-beliefs of 
contemporary societies is a matter which cannot be further discussed here. 
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